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THE CASE FOR FEDERAL ANTI-GERRYMANDERING
LEGISLATION
Brian O'Neill*
Partisan gerrymandering is a political tradition the United States can no longer
afford. Due in part to the effects of partisan gerrymandering, very few congres-
sional elections are meaningfully competitive. This Note argues that partisan
gerrymandering damages both the quality of American democracy and the federal
system of the United States. This Note concludes that the important federal inter-
ests at stake warrant action by Congress to halt partisan gerrymandering. The
Note further concludes that any action by Congress should incorporate the princi-
ples offederalism by resisting the temptation to micromanage and Congress should
instead require state commissions to draft the boundaries of congressional districts.
I. INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Constitution states that the federal legislature shall be
chosen by "the People of the several States."' However, the Elec-
tions Clause grants states the power to regulate the "Times, Places
and Manner" of congressional elections, subject to the power of
Congress to "make or alter such Regulations."2 The Constitution
gives states the ability to undermine the people, but names Con-
gress as the protector of the people's right to vote for House
members.
Recent trends show Congress failing in that duty. In the 2002
congressional election, the major parties left eighty seats uncon-
tested,3 the average margin of victory was the highest in fifty years,'
and 373 of the 377 incumbents who stood for reelection won.5 More
than eighty percent of incumbents won in landslides---garnering
sixty percent of the vote or more.6 All fifty-three members of the
* A.B. Princeton University, 2002;J.D., University of Michigan, 2005. Thanks are due
to Professor Daniel Halberstamn for assisting the author with this Note and to Professor Ellen
Katz for introducing the author to voting rights law. This Note is dedicated to Katherine
Vestal and the author's family, without whom this Note would not exist.
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1.
2. Id. § 4, cl. 1.
3. Sam Hirsch, The United States House of Unrepresentatives: What Went Wrong in the Latest
Round of Congressional Redistricting, 2 ELECTION L.J. 179, 195 n.52 (2003).
4. Id. at 182.
5. Id. at 187.
6. Note, A New Map: Partisan Gerrymandering as a Federalism Injury, 117 HARV. L. REv.
1196, 1202 (2004) [hereinafter A New Map].
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California House delegation were returned to Washington in
2004.' Statistics like those recently led Justice Stevens to conclude
that "[a] mple evidence demonstrates that many of today's congres-
sional representatives owe their allegiance not to 'the People of the
several states' but to the mercy of state legislatures," which secure
such results through partisan gerrymandering.8
State elected officials exercise significant influence on who gets
elected to Congress.9 For example, in Michigan, though the state
only lost one seat to reapportionment, the state legislature was able
to pit three pairs of Democratic incumbents against one another
and give seven Republicans safe seats.' ° Democrats would have
needed fifty-eight percent of the statewide vote to garner a majority
of the delegation." Pennsylvania Republicans did even better: they
forced two sets of Democratic incumbents to run against one an-
other, while pitting a Republican incumbent against a Democratic
incumbent in a heavily Republican district. 2 Congress has the
power to limit such state influence, 3 and it should.
7. See Adam Nagourney, States See Growing Campaign for New Redistricting Laws, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 7, 2005, at A19.
8. Veith v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 327 n.24 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting A
New Map, supra note 6, at 1202).
9. The precise extent of the influence of gerrymandering is debatable, at least as an
empirical matter and on a national basis. See Nathaniel Persily, Reply: In Defense of Foxes
Guarding Henhouses: The Case for Judicial Acquiescence for Incumbent Protecting Genymanders, 116
HARV. L. REv. 649, 658-67 (2002). Persily offers a brief and useful explanation of arguments
that the influence of gerrymandering is small, though not insignificant. These include the
interesting observation that the data on incumbent reelection-which show high rates-are
skewed by the choices of weak incumbents not to run. I& at 659. There are clearly many
factors in high incumbent reelection rates: better fund-raising, better political skills, better
connections in the community, publicity, political pork, the well-known ability of elected
officials to solve bureaucratic problems for their constituents, and leadership. Faced with an
entire fifty-three member delegation returned to office, however, empiricism withers and
other explanations lose comparative significance. Moreover, of all the factors influencing
incumbent reelection, only gerrymandering permits of a simple solution devoid of constitu-
tional problems (as opposed, for instance, to campaign-finance reform). In fact, many of the
other "advantages" simply result from doing a good job in office; clearly election law should
not discourage good representation. This Note will argue that the problem to be remedied
is really the appearance of illegitimacy that partisan gerrymandering creates, and that the
illegitimacy follows partly from the diminution of the barriers between state and federal
government.
10. Hirsch, supra note 3, at 205. One indicator of safety was that "[o] n average, 79% of
the constituents in the Republican incumbents' new districts were also constituents in their
prior districts, as compared to only 51% for Democratic incumbents' new districts." Id.
11. Charles S. Bullock III, Redistricting: Racial & Partisan Considerations, in LAw &
ELECTION POLITICS: RuLEs OF THE GAME 151, 165 (MathewJ. Streb ed., 2005).
12. A New Map, supra note 6, at 1203.
13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
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Congress should use its power to limit state influence because
partisan gerrymandering diminishes the quality of representation
in the House and makes House election results dependent upon
control of state government. 14 That latter effect both contravenes
the original conception of federalism and diminishes the ability of
voters to choose differing state and federal policies. This Note
therefore argues that gerrymandering of congressional districts
harms federalism and that federalist principles justify congres-
sional intervention to separate state legislatures from the
congressional districting process. It also argues, however, that fed-
eral control over the details of districting would be problematic,
and that Congress should therefore leave the mechanics of the
separation to the states. Part II of this Note will explain gerryman-
dering and the current state of the law. Part III will examine the
harm to federalism caused by partisan gerrymandering from two
angles: the intentions of the founders and the functional harms.
Part IV will discuss the possible justifications for federal interven-
tion, focusing on the ability of Congress to forge a political
consensus for the nation and to enforce fundamental rights. Part V
will discuss the possibilities of both judicial and congressional ac-
tion, concluding that the judiciary cannot act, that Congress
should, and that the congressional response must employ the prin-
ciples of federalism. Part VI will summarize various state responses
to the problem and propose language for a statute that would
force states to take action. Finally, Part VII will conclude that con-
gressional action is justified and should be federalist in nature.
II. THE DEFINITION AND TRADITIONAL HARM
OF GERRYMANDERING
Congress mandates that states carve electoral districts for each
seat allotted to the state from the 435 available seats in the House
of Representatives. 5 The drawing of these districts, commonly
14. State redistricting, of course, is also fodder for gerrymandering. It, however, ex-
ceeds the scope of this Note.
15. 2 U.S.C.A. § 2c (West 2005):
In each State entitled in the Ninety-first Congress or in any subsequent Congress
thereafter to more than one Representative under an apportionment made pursuant
to the provisions of section 2a(a) of this tile, there shall be established by law a num-
ber of districts equal to the number of Representatives to which such State is so
entitled, and Representatives shall be elected only from districts so established, no
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called "districting," does not begin with a blank slate. The process
takes place against the backdrop of a varied nation with enormous
states of small populations, large, politically uniform urban areas,
and urban areas starkly divided by politics. In some areas, turnout
is routinely high, while in others it is routinely low. All of these
variations create bias in the electoral process.1 6 Common sense in-
dicates that drawing a district leaning to the Republicans in San
Francisco would be quite difficult, while drawing a district leaning
to the Democrats might be difficult in Kansas. Districting will
clearly not be the most significant factor in determining who wins a
district in a great many places.
But what about the larger, less homogenous areas? They present
elected officials with an opportunity to handicap the opposition.
Gerrymandering officials employ numerous tactics: combining
large portions of two incumbents' districts into one; "packing" the
maximum number of citizens who consistently vote for one party
in the same district, thereby eliminating their influence elsewhere;
and "cracking" a large block of partisan voters into many districts,
thereby diluting their influence by spreading it everywhere.17 In
general, employment of such tactics is called "gerrymandering"
after Elbridge Gerry, the Massachusetts governor who presided
over the first notably bizarre and overtly partisan districting.18
The damage caused by such activity is difficult to define and de-
pends largely on the concept of politics employed in the analysis.
The belief that competition within electoral districts is essential will
yield a different definition of the harm than the belief that propor-
tional representation on a statewide basis is valuable. The Supreme
Court previously accepted the latter belief and approved districting
plans designed to eliminate competition and to provide a fair allo-
cation of political power. 9 When allocations have been challenged
as unfair, the Court has adopted an equal protection analysis.20
district to elect more than one Representative (except that a State which is entitled to
more than one Representative and which has in all previous elections elected its Rep-
resentatives at Large may elect its Representatives at Large to the Ninety-first
Congress.
16. See generally Hirsch, supra note 3, at 179, 194 (describing "distributional bias").
17. Id. at 194.
18. David L. Anderson, Note, When Restraint Requires Activism: Partisan Gerymandering
and the Status Quo Ante, 42 STAN. L. Rav. 1549, 1550-51 (1990).
19. See Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 752 (1973) (upholding a districting plan
that "attempted to reflect the relative strength of the parties in locating and defining elec-
tion districts").
20. SeeDavis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
[VOL. 38:3
The Case for Federal Anti-G erymandering Legislation
Generally speaking, that is where the law stands today. In Davis
v. Bandemer, a plurality of the Court found that "unconstitutional
discrimination occurs only when the electoral system is arranged in
a manner that will consistently degrade a voter's or a group of vot-
ers' influence on the political process as a whole."22 The allegation
is essentially that one group is given greater power at the expense
of another, leaving the other in the political wilderness. 3
An illustration may prove helpful. In a hypothetical state of 400
Democrats and 500 Republicans distributed into four districts of
100 Democrats and 125 Republicans each, no Democrats are likely
to be satisfied with their representative because Republicans will
win every seat. But, if Democrats controlled the districting process,
the lines could be drawn to create two districts with 200 Democrats
and twenty-five unhappy Republicans. The harshest gerrymander
would produce three Democratic districts. Under that gerryman-
der, Republicans would be understandably irate that they, as a
group, have not gained control of a majority of the legislative seats,
though they are a clear majority of the population. Thus, the
prevalent understanding of the harm is that it is "partisan vote di-
lution," and hence an equal protection problem. 4 It is, however,
one with a unique standard of proof: consistent degradation of
participation in the "political process as a whole.
25
Not only is that standard extraordinarily high, but equal protec-
tion doctrine is also not particularly apt in the partisan
gerrymandering context.2 6 Its elements are essentially not provable,
at least in the strict doctrinal way that the Supreme Court has ana-
lyzed the problem. Proof of an equal protection violation requires
two elements: discriminatory effect and discriminatory intent.27 De-
fining the effect is difficult because the affected are an amorphous
and constantly shifting group.2s Each election forms new groups.
21. SeeVeith v.Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004) (failing to overturn Bandemerin a plural-
ity decision).
22. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 132.
23. See id. at 110 ("The claim is whether each political group in the State should have
the same chance to elect representatives of its choice as any other political group .. ").
24. See Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARV. L. REv. 593,
604 (2002) (discussing how this conception of the harm caused by partisan gerrymandering
arose).
25. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 132.
26. Racial gerrymandering is different because race is an immutable characteristic.
27. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-41 (1976) (discussing the intent require-
ment of equal protection claims).
28. See Issacharoff, supra note 24, at 603 (noting that American political parties lack
membership requirements and that their support is therefore only truly revealed in election
results).
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Further, "[p] olitical affiliation is not an immutable characteristic,
but may shift from one election to the next; and even within a
given election, not all voters follow the party line."2 9 Each election
is different, as is each candidate. Even in the most heavily gerry-
mandered district, "the political party which puts forward an
utterly incompetent candidate will lose."30 The group harmed-for
purposes of equal protection analysis-is always shifting, never cer-
tain." For the purpose of politicians engaged in gerrymandering,
of course, this is manifestly not the case because politicians would
not bother to gerrymander otherwise. But, the law is more exact-
ing.2
The second element-intent-also presents a substantial im-
pediment to judicial review of redistricting. Intent is difficult to
determine for an entire legislature. Furthermore, the degree of
intent is ambiguous: "Does it mean, for instance, that partisan in-
tent must outweigh all other goals-contiguity, compactness,
preservation of neighborhoods, etc.... ?"" Though the "predomi-
nant intent" test advanced by Plaintiffs in Veith v. Jubelirer,34 the
Supreme Court's most recent redistricting case, came directly from
the Court's racial gerrymandering jurisprudence, its utility in parti-
san gerrymandering cases is significantly lower because political
considerations are legal, "root-and-branch a matter of politics."
5
Given the above difficulties with applying equal protection to
gerrymandering, a plurality of the Veith Court condemned the en-
tire enterprise of policing redistricting as too nebulous:
While one must agree with Justice Breyer's incredibly abstract
starting point that our Constitution sought to create a "basi-
cally democratic" form of government ... that is a long and
impassable distance away from the conclusion that the judici-
ary may assess whether a group (somehow defined) has
achieved a level of political power (somehow defined) com-
29. Veith v.Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 287 (2004).
30. Id.
31. See id. ("These facts make it impossible to assess the effects of partisan gerryman-
dering, to fashion a standard for evaluating a violation, and finally to craft a remedy." (citing
Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 156 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment))). But
see Veith, 541 U.S. at 327 (Stevens, J, dissenting) ("Gerrymanders necessarily rest on legisla-
tors' predictions that "members of certain identifiable groups ... will vote in the same way."
(quoting Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 87 (1980))).
32. See Veith, 541 U.S. at 287.




The Case for Federal Anti-Geriymandering Legislation
mensurate with that to which they would be entitled absent
unjustified political machinations (whatever that means) 36
Thus, it concluded that the judiciary lacks sufficient authority to
protect such an "abstract" political principle.37 Nevertheless, the
court agreed that "partisan gerrymanders [are incompatible] with
democratic principles.0
8
Because the Supreme Court has chosen not to solve the prob-
lem, Congress must step into the breach, or the states must reform
themselves, if the problem is to be solved at all. The question then
is what conception of democratic principles and democratic proc-
esses provides the soundest basis for addressing the problem. One
of the principles of American democracy is federalism, and a fed-
eralist analysis of gerrymandering yields insights into both the
nature of the problem and the potential solutions.
III. THE FEDERALISM HARM OF PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING
A Note recently appearing in the Harvard Law Review entitled A
New Map: Partisan Gerrymandering as a Federalism Injury suggests that
"state legislatures' current redistricting practices have subverted
the Founders' conception of [the] balance of power"3 9 between
states and the federal government, and that they had damaged the
"federalist structure"o° by the "exercise of state choice." 4' The Note
theorized that this exercise of power by state legislatures damages
the "constitutional structure of dual sovereignty."42 Implicitly, it
embraces the notion that widespread competitive elections are
necessary to prevent harm to federalism.43 That conclusion, how-
ever, leaves a fundamental question unanswered: how is the
federalist system supposed to work?
There are two basic ways to answer that question. First, history can
provide a guide: federalism is supposed to work as the founders
36. Id. at 299.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 292.
39. A New Map, supra note 6, at 1198.
40. Id. at 1209.
41. Id. at 1211.
42. Id. at 1204.
43. See id. Though the Note ostensibly argues that the problem is not lack of voter
choice, but rather the exercise of state choice, the former is the inescapable corollary of the
latter. See id. at 1211.
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intended." Second, one might look to the functioning of the sys-
tem: how does partisan gerrymandering affect the way the voters
choose and the government works?
A. The Founders' View
The Founders viewed the House as the bastion of the people in
a government otherwise closely tied to the states. They hoped to
create an independent federal government by allowing the people
to choose their own representatives, as opposed to their Senators
and Presidents. Voting rules that give state governments significant
control over the partisan balance of their congressional delegation
diminish that independence, and hence diminish the federal sys-
tem as well.
Federal independence derives from the "constitutional structure
of dual sovereignty,"45 which entails direct participation and citi-
zenship in both federal and state governments. Direct elections,
however, were initially quite contentious in the Constitutional
Convention." So too was their administration. Some delegates fa-
vored election "in such manner as the Legislature of each State
should direct" because the state legislatures can "accomodate [sic]
the mode [of election] to the conveniency & opinions of the peo-
ple."47 Further, one argued that state responsibility would "avoid
the undue influence of large Counties which would prevail if the
elections were to be made in districts as must be the mode in-
tended by the Report of the Committee" and allow disputed
elections to be resolved locally.' Others, including Alexander
Hamilton, opposed that position as a severe weakening of the fed-
eral government." The discussion ended inconclusively when a
delegate "moved that the 1st. branch be elected by the people in
such mode as the Legislatures should direct" and "waved it on its
44. What, if any, importance should the intentions of the founders have in constitu-
tional interpretation or resolution of federalism issues generally is not a question that can be
answered here, though it will be addressed obliquely in the following sections. Their opin-
ions are certainly worth exploring, however, even if only because so many people believe
them to be important.
45. A New Map, supra note 6, at 1204.
46. Various delegates advocated both legislative choice and direct election. SeeJAMES
MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 74-81 (Ohio Univ.
Press 1966) (1840).
47. Id. at 166 (comments of General Pinkney).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 166-67 (comments of Alexander Hamilton).
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being hinted that such a provision might be more properly tried in
the detail of the plan."50 The discussion shows concern that elec-
tion by the people not be degraded, tempered with pragmatic
concerns regarding how such elections would work. The final lan-
guage of Article I reflects both concerns by granting the right to
choose to the people and delegating the logistics to the states.
The grant of congressional power to overrule state decisions on
elections answers Hamilton's concern that the federal government
not be weakened. That grant of power goes straight to the heart
of the whole federalist enterprise. It shows the eventual triumph of
those who wished for a federal government with independent sig-
nificance-one that did not in every respect depend on the states
for its identity.53 Madison feared that choice of representatives by
state legislatures would place "too great an agency of the State
Governments in the General one."54 Hamilton agreed.
But, why did they want to separate the two governments? Two
answers seem most important: (1) opposition will ensure freedom;
and (2) the federal government will ameliorate the effects of fac-
tion.
State governments could limit the federal government to its
proper sphere. Indeed, Hamilton thought state governments
would combat the federal. He wrote in Federalist No. 26 that:
[T]he State legislatures, who will always be not only vigilant
but suspicious and jealous guardians of the rights of the citi-
zens against encroachments from the federal government, will
constantly have their attention awake to the conduct of the
national rulers, and will be ready enough, if anything im-
proper appears, to sound the alarm to the people, and not
only to be the VOICE, but, if necessary, the ARM of their dis-
content.
56
50. Id. at 168 (comments of General Pinkney).
51. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
52. MADISON, supra note 46, at 166-67 (comments of Alexander Hamilton).
53. Whereas the powers of the federal government are independent, its identity would
be compromised if all federal officers and representatives were appointed by state govern-
ments.
54. MADISON, supra note 46, at 75 (comments ofJames Madison).
55. A New Map, supra note 6, at 1200 ("State influence ... could not be too watchfully
guarded ag[ain]st.").
56. Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1515 (1994) (quot-
ing THE FEDERALIST No. 26, at 172 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
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Far from anticipating cooperation to further entrenchment,
Hamilton anticipated confrontation, even open war. Madison
shared his view.57 The tension between the governments, however,
was not an evil; rather, these men believed such tension guarded
against the "improper" use of power by the federal government.
58
Perhaps more importantly, federal government could mitigate
the dangers inherent in small republics like the states. Both Madi-
son and Hamilton saw excessive state power as destructive to the
fledgling union.' 9 Madison feared the excesses of democracy, espe-
cially in the states.60 He sought a remedy for "diseases most
incident to republican government,, 61 including factional strife
and minority oppression. He found a partial remedy in federalism,
which he viewed as fundamental to the preservation of liberty.6
Thus, he asked of the Constitutional Convention: "Was it to be
supposed that republican liberty could long exist under the abuses
of it practised [sic] in some of the States."63 Separating the state
and national governments would corral faction by forcing state fac-
tions to compete in the national arena.64 For federalism to
successfully mitigate the effects of faction, however, the Constitu-
tion had to prevent capture of the federal government by the
states: Congress needed the power to overrule manipulative state
election laws that could allow the ruling party to continue in power
57. SeeTHE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 266 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961):
The same combinations ... would result from an apprehension of the federal, as was
produced by the dread of a foreign, yoke; and unless the projected innovations
should be voluntarily renounced, the same appeal to a trial of force would be made
in the one case as was made in the other .... A few representatives of the people
would be opposed to the people themselves; or rather one set of representatives
would be contending against thirteen sets of representatives, with the whole body of
their common constituents on the side of the latter.
58. Kramer, supra note 56, at 1515 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 26, at 172 (Alexan-
der Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
59. See id; see generally MADISON, supra note 46.
60. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 52 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
61. Id.
62. MADISON, supra note 46, at 75-77. Indeed, Madison found in federalism the cure
for the excesses of democracy. He argued that: "[tihe friend of popular governments never
finds himself so much alarmed for their character and fate, as when he contemplates their
propensity to this dangerous vice," but that federalism "provides a proper cure for it." THE
FEDERALIST No. 10, at 45 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). In Madison's view,
federalism would regulate faction, and thereby preserve liberty.
63. MADISON, supra note 46, at 76.
64. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 48 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (argu-
ing that faction "will be unable to execute and mask its violence under the forms of the
Constitution" because of the greater numbers of citizens under the federal government, and
the mediating role of Congress).
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in perpetuity. Otherwise, manipulation of congressional elections
would magnify the power of faction in Congress.
The warnings of the Anti-Federalist author "Brutus" have pecu-
liar and ironic resonance here.6 5 "Brutus" took exception to Article
I, Section 4 in particular because it could operate in an anti-
democratic fashion. He worried that "[b]y this clause the right of
election itself, is, in a great measure, transferred from the people
to their rulers." 6 Once entrenched, "[r]easoning with [Congress]
will be in vain," and the people "will then have to wrest from their
oppressors, by a strong hand. [sic] that which they now possess,
and which they may retain if they will exercise but a moderate
share of prudence and firmness."67 Even more despairingly, he
claimed that "[w]hen a people once resign the privilege of a fair
election, they clearly have none left worth contending for.""8 Brutus
eloquently identified the risks of entrenched federal power. But,
they apply equally well to states."
Later developments augmented the sense of separation articu-
lated by the Federalists. To a degree, the very existence of the
Seventeenth Amendment argues for a constitutional policy of
separation between the state legislatures and the federal govern-
ment.70 The founders favored state legislative choice of Senators
"because it helped them sidestep what Madison described in Fed-
eralist No. 37 as the 'arduous' task of 'marking the proper line of
partition, between the authority of the general, and that of the
State Governments.' ,7 ' The Seventeenth Amendment turned the
tenuous line of partition between governments into banishment by
mandating the direct election of Senators.
65. Brutus, To the People of the State of New-York, in 2 THE CoMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST
382 (HerbertJ. Storing ed., 1981). Brutus was the pen name of an unknown anti-ratification
author during the constitutional debates.
66. Id. at 386.
67. Id. at 387.
68. Id. at 386.
69. The phenomenon of partisan redistricting is not merely due to the actions of state
politicians, as the recent redistricting of Texas illustrates.
70. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, § 1:
The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each state,
elected by the people thereof, for six years; and each Senator shall have one vote.
The electors in each state shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the
most numerous branch of the state legislatures.
71. THE FEDERALIST No. 37, at 234 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)
(quoted in Ralph A. Rossum, The Irony of Constitutional Democracy: Federalism, the Supreme Court,
and the Seventeenth Amendment, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 671, 680 (1999)).
72. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, § 1.
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The intentions of the founders seem clear both from their de-
bates and the text of the Constitution: the federal and state
governments were to oppose one another." Their whole notion of
citizenship in the nation and direct national governance depended
upon maintaining an appropriate separation between state and
federal government-a separation that included the independence
of the House from the states. The Madisonian purpose of the fed-
eral government is to control faction, and it cannot fulfill that
purpose without independence. To the extent that state legisla-
tures' gerrymandering efforts violate that independence by
prearranging with their parties who will represent the various dis-
tricts, gerrymandering therefore violates a fundamental principle
of federalism.
Based on that principle, the drafters of the Constitution rea-
sonably relied upon the self-interest of House members to protect
the independence of the House and upon the Senate to moderate
that self-interest. But, history proved the Founders wrong in this, as
in so many other things.
B. The Party System
What the founders could not have anticipated was that the self-
interest of Congressmen would run the other way. History quickly
proved the "Federalist" conception of federalism unrealistic, and
"within a short time, an established group of national leaders with
popular support existed alongside state politicians."74 Congressmen
now depend on state politicians for protection from the people,
and they do so without consequence because of the party system:
political parties minimize the distinction between federal and state
control of elections. The early emergence of political parties
proved the "simple 'us/them' division implicit in the vision of the
75Federalist Papers" wrong.
Two functions of political parties are of particular importance:
"first, parties offer tangible aid to help candidates get elected; sec-
ond, parties provide a fraternal connection among officials that
helps expedite the day-to-day affairs of governing."7 6 These func-
73. See generally, Kramer, supra note 56, at 1510-11 (discussing the interests of con-
gressmen).
74. See Kramer, supra note 56, at 1518.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1528.
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tions link levels of government, with national political parties help-
77
ing state candidates, and vice versa.
Such entanglement complicates the understanding of gerry-
mandering: bare state legislative control cannot be reasonably
alleged because state politicians are part of a larger system. But
clearly, party loyalty has caused state politicians to abuse the power
granted to them by the Constitution.
The drastic change occasioned by the rise of partisanship argues
that the opinions of the framers be accorded less weight. History
has proved the founders' assumptions mistaken; hence, their con-
clusions must be suspect. Further, originalism derives its force from
the notion that "[t] he Constitution was intended by the founding
generation to be not only lex legum, a law of laws, but also lex im-
mutabilis, unalterable law, unless changed by the amendment
process., 78 The historical concept of governmental independence,
however, is not easily located within any particular clause of the
Constitution: instead, finite components of that concept are scat-
tered all over the Constitution. The concept exists only
interstitially-between and amongst the finite provisions. It ap-
pears only in action-in the workings of the government. Thus, it
cannot be lex immutabilis. Moreover, the Framers did not expect it
to be. After all, they expected conflict.79 That is not to say original
intent has no force in delimiting acceptable districting, only that it
is not dispositive; functional effects must be considered as well.
C. The Functional Harms of Partisan Gerrymandering
More significant than history is the gerrymander's effect. Parti-
san control of the redistricting process has significant effects on
government: (1) decreased quality of federal representation;
(2) bundled state and federal policy decisions for the voter; and
(3) diminished accountability. But, a fourth consideration is that
partisan gerrymandering may also allow more people to be repre-
sented by their party.
1. Decreased Quality of Representation-The Supreme Court has ac-
knowledged representational harm in the context of racial
77. Id. at 1529.
78. Henry Paul Monaghan, Symposium: Doing Originalism, 104 COLUM. L. REv. 32, 34
(2004).
79. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 46 (James Madison).
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gerrymandering.8 ° In Shaw v. Reno, the Court invalidated a redistrict-
ing scheme that threatened to skew representatives' priorities."' The
Court found the two districts at issue so bizarrely shaped that their
drawing was "unexplainable on grounds other than race" and that
812the districting therefore violated equal protection. Justice
O'Connor described the injury:
When a district obviously is created solely to effectuate the
perceived common interests of one racial group, elected offi-
cials are more likely to believe that their primary obligation is
to represent only the members of that group, rather than
their constituency as a whole. This is altogether antithetical to
our system of representative democracy.8
3
Veith v. Jubelirer provided the Court an opportunity to apply that
principle to partisan gerrymandering as well. 4 In his dissenting
opinion in Veith, Justice Stevens compared the effects of racial and
partisan gerrymandering. Justice Stevens noted that "[t] he parallel
danger of a partisan gerrymander is that the representative will
perceive that the people who put her in power are those who drew
the map rather than those who cast ballots, and she will feel be-
holden not to a subset of her constituency, but to no part of her
constituency at all."85
Thus, gerrymandering frees representatives to pursue their own
interests over their constituents'.8 6 "In this sense, incumbency ad-
vantage works much like increasing the length of a representative's
term of office," or the granting of a monopoly.8 7 These effects rele-
gate nearly all competition to the primary, where the incumbent
possesses still other advantages. 8 Partisan gerrymandering accord-
ingly has severe antidemocratic effects, and state legislatures cause
them. That makes it a federalism problem.
2. Bundling-Additionally, policy consistency across federal and
state levels engendered by the party system renders the distinction
80. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
81. Id. at 643.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 648.
84. 541 U.S. 267 (2004) (Stevens,J., dissenting).
85. Id. at 330.
86. Daniel R. Ortiz, Federalism, Reapportionment, and Incumbency: Leading the Legislature to
Police Itself 4J.L. & POL. 653, 675 (1988).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 677.
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between national and local irrelevant in many ways.89 In a regime of
partisan gerrymandering, voting for the favored state party dimin-
ishes the probability of success for the favored federal party
whenever those parties differ.90 Partisan gerrymandering thus bun-
dles numerous policies-from international relations to the sales
tax, from Indian Gaming to environmental regulation-into a sin-
gle vote. If the voter's choice for state legislature renders it more
difficult to elect a federal representative favoring high defense
spending (or any uniquely federal policy), that voter has lost some-
thing. The Federalist system is designed to separate those choices. 9'
3. Accountability-Extreme partisan gerrymandering also frus-
trates the ability of voters to hold representatives accountable.
Where gerrymanders seek to protect incumbents above all else, they
frequently move large numbers of voters into new districts. Thus,
those voters have no opportunity to voice their disapproval of the
representation they received: the representative has moved on to
greener pastures-voters that already approve of his or her poli-
cies.92 This is the corollary of diminished quality of representation.
Accountability, though, is a principle value of federalism. In New
York v. United States, the Court struck down part of a federal law that
would have required states to take title to waste not disposed of
within the requisite period of time.93 The Court feared that "where
the Federal Government directs the States to regulate, it may be
state officials who will bear the brunt of public disapproval, while
the federal officials who devised the regulatory program may re-
main insulated from the electoral ramifications of their decision."
9 4
With gerrymandering the harm is the converse: federal officials
suffer because of state elections. The critical principle of the case is
89. Kramer, supra note 56, at 1529.
90. The bipartisan gerrymander-where the parties agree to create safe seats for all-
is a different problem. See Richard H. Pildes, Forward: The Constitutionalization of Democratic
Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 28, 63-64 (2004) (providing a fuller explanation of the nefarious
effects of the bipartisan gerrymander).
91. Clearly, there is some overlap in policy where both governments operate, but
where certain activities--like environmental regulation (itself a controversial federalism
issue), national defense, and international relations-are either strongly influenced by or
are the exclusive province of the federal government, the voter suffers some harm in dimin-
ished choice because of gerrymandering. Additionally, the increased power of state
legislators in party politics may improve their ability to harness the federal government to
uniquely state ends. Gerrymandering may also therefore pose a threat to horizontal federal-
ism-the division of responsibilities and powers between the state and federal governments.
92. See generally Hirsch, supra note 3, at 212-13 (discussing the criterion of accountabil-
ity among other redistricting criteria).
93. SeeNewYork v. U.S., 505 U.S. 144, 169 (1992).
94. Id.
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that federalism precludes insulation from the "electoral ramifica-
tions" of decisions.95 The critical point against gerrymandering is
that it "threatens a core tenet of democratic legitimacy: account-
ability to shifting voter preferences.
9 6
4. Increased Contentment With Representation-There is, however,
an important countervailing consideration to the above argu-
ments: if voters do not have defined policy preferences, and
instead vote based on party affiliation, then the federalism harm
may not matter to them. Because the would-be "political monopo-
list" governing the redistricting process "relies on barriers defined
by the aggregation of consumer preferences themselves" 9' to ger-
rymander his or her party into greater power, the "packed" get the
representation they want, even if they do not receive proportionate
power in the House. On the other hand, "cracked" voters are left
completely dissatisfied. The high number of landslide victories in
congressional elections suggests that there is more packing than
cracking.
Identifying this form of representation as the principle value-
not of federalism, but of democratic government-relegates the
act of voting to a mere means of legitimating a predetermined out-
come. The overall desirability of such a system hinges on whether
or not a competitive election is desirable because of its beneficial
effects: unbundling of policies, higher responsiveness, and the op-
portunity to hold individual representatives accountable for the
quality of representation they provide. It also depends on whether
or not a competitive election is necessary as a matter of fundamen-
tal rights, regardless of its practical implications for representation.
IV. THE FEDERAL INTERESTS
The federalism detriments and (lone, but not insignificant)
benefit of partisan gerrymandering only begin the discussion. The
next logical question is "who solves the problem?" The federal gov-
ernment's power to act is not self-justifying, however explicitly
grounded in the constitutional text. Further, there is nothing
95. See id.
96. Issacharoff, supra note 24, at 600.
97. Ortiz, supra note 86, at 676.
98. There is also this to consider: voters may not care about their representative per se.
Instead, they may merely care about their party's representation in the House. The resolu-
tion of this potential controversy is beyond the scope of this Note.
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about the functional effects of gerrymandering that renders states
incapable of solving the problem. In fact, several states have tried,
as will be discussed in Part VI. Thus, federal action cannot be justi-
fied as the default position, but it can be justified by the federalism
harms caused by partisan gerrymandering. Harm to the quality of
representation of any one state is a matter for the whole nation. So
too is the fundamental right to vote.9
A. Quality of Representation
The federal government is uniquely suited to protecting its own
legitimacy. The allocation of responsibilities enshrined in the Con-
stitution implies as much. For instance, each house has the
responsibility of judging the disputed elections of its members.00
Each house may also compel its members' attendance, set its own
rules, and even expel members. 101 The judging function has been
used frequently in the House.02 To protect the national interest in
legitimate representation, a Senate subcommittee recounted every
vote in the 1924 Iowa Senatorial Election. The Senate also con-
ducted a partial recount in the 1974 New Hampshire Election.'
This review power acknowledges mutual interest of every citizen
in the legitimate representation of all. To the extent that basic prin-
ciples of federalism require the separation of state government from
the federal, failure to maintain separation threatens the legitimacy
of the House as a representative body. The legitimacy of any one
state's congressional delegation is a national matter because every
state's citizens will naturally want the federal government to be le-
gitimate: an unrepresentative delegation could taint the entire
legislative process, and tainted laws affect all citizens. Furthermore,
Congress can achieve a national political consensus about what le-
gitimate representation requires far more easily than fifty state
99. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964) ("[T]he right of suffrage is a fun-
damental matter in a free and democratic society. Especially since the right to exercise the
franchise in a free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and political
rights....").
100. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1.
101. Id. at cls. 1, 2.
102. ANGIE WELBORN, HOUSE CONTESTED ELECTION CASES: 1933 TO 2000, vii (Susan
Boriotti & Donna Dennis eds., 2003).
103. SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE
POLITICAL PROCESS 242 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., rev. 2d ed. 2002).
104. Id.
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governments, though the House as an institution has little incen-
tive to do so. Nevertheless, as a matter of capacity, Congress is
better suited to address the issue than the many states.
B. Fundamental Rights and Nationhood
There is something more to the allocation of the power of de-
termining legitimacy to the federal government than mere
expediency or consensus building. That something may be behind
the Guarantee Clause of Article IV. That clause entrusts to the fed-
eral government the maintenance of the republican government
105of each state, suggesting at least that the framers believed that
Congress's judgment about basic democratic principles should
have broad application. But why?
One reason is that federal action to protect rights might be nec-
essary for national economic and social cohesion. 6 Certain basic
rights are central to the American concept of the United States as a
nation, and violation of these rights by individual states has in the
past caused considerable turmoil. After the Civil War, Jim Crow,
and the passing of both, it now appears that the federal govern-
ment is the primary guarantor of rights."7 Thus, as a historical
matter, the efficacy of federal involvement to secure important or
fundamental rights is amply displayed. As a Constitutional matter,
the federal government is not just a guarantor of rights, but is also
somehow the source of rights: the Fourteenth Amendment pro-
vides that "[n]o state shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States."' ' Citizenship in the United States provides distinct rights
that Congress enforces.' °9 The principle suggested by the Guaran-
tee Clause is magnified by the Fourteenth Amendment.
105. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. Just as the Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST, art. I, § 8, cl. 8,
allows Congress to bind the nation together economically, so to does the Republican Form
of Government clause permit Congress to bind the nation together in values. See Michael W.
McConnell, The Redistricting Cases: Original Mistakes and Current Consequences, 24 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 103, 114 (2000) (suggesting that the clause provides a firm basis for rules against
malapportionment).
106. See Richard E. Levy, An Unwelcome Stranger: Congressional Individual Rights Power and
Federalism, 44 U. KAN. L. REv. 61, 96-97 (1995).
107. See generally Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders'Design, 54 U.
CH. L. REV. 1484, 1502-04 (1987) (book review).
108. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
109. See id.
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As a functional matter, however, the propriety of federal en-
forcement of fundamental rights is less clear. The problem is that
defining the right itself invites dispute. To the extent there is no
national consensus, a variety of local solutions could maximize citi-
zen contentment. '° Because rights are likely to provoke intense
feelings, that argument applies even more strongly to rights than
to regulations. Furthermore, though suppression of liberty may be
less likely in a larger republic, at least by Madison's theory, "[t]he
lesser likelihood must be balanced against the greater magnitude
of the danger.""' With the definition and enforcement of rights in
the hands of the states, national suppression is less likely.
Thus, there are at least two powerful opposing principles at issue
in federal definition and enforcement of fundamental rights: the
need to define national values that bind the states and their citi-
zens together, and the desire to maximize contentment with the
government. When emotions run high, as they have over rights
issues in the past, the opposition has become quite stark.'
2
When the topic is dull, complicated, even esoteric, one might
imagine only a small number of agitators clamoring for the imposi-
tion of their version of a fundamental right in their own state or in
another's. Redistricting is like that--dull, complicated, and most
certainly esoteric. Moreover, the predominance of safe districts
means that in most districts the majority is probably happy with the
party representing them. The system produces the right results for
those voters, even if the process is less than exciting, or, indeed,
even pointless. Redistricting in a general sense is not an issue inte-
gral to the nation's concept of itself."3 It is therefore a relatively
safe issue for the federal government.
Redistricting is a safe issue, but is also still a vital one. Framed
differently, redistricting can be seen to implicate fundamental
rights that are integral to the nation's concept of itself. Professor
Samuel Issacharoff asks what would happen if clever districting re-
placed elections. It somehow seems wrong, even though the results
110. See Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism,
100 COLUM. L. Ray. 215, 222 (2000) ("The whole point of federalism (or at least the best
reason to care about it) is that, because preferences for governmental policy are unevenly
distributed among the states and regions of the nation, more people can be satisfied by
decentralized decisionmaking.").
111. McConnell, supra note 107, at 1503.
112. One need only recall the fight over school integration to sense the truth of that
statement.
113. In fact, there is little reason to think that districted elections are integral to the na-
tion's self-conception.
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are the same."' Thus, Congress would be right to support the no-
tion that the long campaign culminating in the casting of the
ballot is more than merely the means by which voters register their
fixed, largely immutable preferences. "5 If one instead views elec-
tion campaigns as a means of creating preferences, then
competition between the candidates assumes immense impor-
tance. It is competition that forces candidates to pursue the
priorities of voters." 6 Thus, accountability achieved through com-
petition validates the electoral result."7 Accountability is also one of
the bedrock principles of federalism that partisan gerrymandering
undermines. "8 Cognizance of the importance of competition "lays
the foundation for contesting any idea that there can be 'just' po-
litical outcomes independent of the competitive integrity of the
electoral process." 19 It provides the basis for a theory of voting that
"ties back to the undeveloped original Madisonian understanding
of republican government as one that 'derives all its powers ...
from the great body of the people; and is administered by persons
holding their offices during pleasure, for a limited period, or dur-
ing good behaviour.'"
2
This is a powerful vision of democracy, and apparently one with
the endorsement of James Madison, but it is by no means uncon-
troversial. It has, for instance, been argued that competition will
further muddy the choice between the parties. 2' Given that both
parties in a competitive election will seek to maximize turnout of
their voters, they will seek to define themselves against the other
candidate. That objection does not seem compelling. Additionally,
competitive districts might produce complete domination by one
party of the delegation from an evenly divided state, at least theo-
retically. 22 But the probability of such an occurrence is intuitively
low enough to discard.
114. See Issacharoff, supra note 24, at 613-15 ("The conceptual harm in simply jettison-
ing elections is that the concept of 'fair' representation has no meaning outside an
appropnately competitive electoral process.").
115. See id. at 616-17 (terming the concept of fixed political preferences "dated").
116. See id. at 615 ("The key to this approach is to view competition as critical to the
ability of voters to ensure the responsiveness of elected officials to the voters' interests
through the after-the-fact capacity to vote those officials out of office.").
117. Id.
118. See supra Part II.
119. Issacharoff, supra note 24, at 617.
120. Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 251 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961)).
121. See, e.g., Persily, supra note 9, at 668-69.
122. See id.; see also Veith v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 358 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(noting that small shifts in electoral preferences can conceivably produce large shifts in
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Thus federal involvement is justifiable to enforce a right to some
level of competition in elections as well as a concept of legitimacy
of representation.2 2 Federal intervention is preferable to separate
state actions because suffrage, however defined, is a fundamental
right. 24 That right should be actuated by the same principles from
state to state throughout the nation in furtherance of national
unity.
V. FEDERAL ADMINISTRATION OF A SOLUTION
Assuming gerrymandering causes some harm to federalism, and
that the federal government has some justification for undertaking
the solution of the problem itself, rather than leaving gerryman-
dering to the states, then the natural question is this: what will the
solution entail? Generally, there are two possibilities: congressional
action or a judicial doctrine creating a fundamental right to elec-
toral competition.
A. Judicial Enforcement of the Fundamental Right
to a Competitive Election
Unlike reform by Congress, reform by the judiciary has no inher-
ent legitimacy. Thus, it must follow by interpretation from existing
law and vindicate some extant right-in this case the right to elec-
toral competition. But, the federal interest in eliminating partisan
gerrymandering implicates a conception of the right to vote that the
Supreme Court has never endorsed. The hope that it will do so is
vain. Exactly why such hope is futile merits examination because the
party representation). But see Samuel Issacharoff, Judging Politics: The Elusive Quest for Judicial
Review of Political Fairness, 71 TEx. L. REv. 1643, 1683 (1993) (arguing that "the votes-to-seats
inquiry masks a subtle departure from the premises of district-based elections," namely, that
the possibility of disproportional representation for political parties is inherent in single-
member district elections).
123. Determination of the requisite degree of competition is beyond the scope of this
Note. It should, in any event, be left to the states for reasons discussed later in this Note. See
infta Part V.
124. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964).
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Court is so often seen as "charged with the evolution and applica-
tion of society's fundamental principles.",
25
As discussed in Part II, the Court conceives of gerrymandering in
equal protection terms: the injury is not to the federal system or to
the individual voter, but to the voters as loosely affiliated, constantly
fluctuating groups.2 6 The harm is a "consistent degradation" of the
afflicted group's political influence. 27 Though federal intervention
could be based on a view of the harm as an affront to federalism-
functionally or historically-the Court is nowhere near defining
such a right.
In fact, no detailed description of the right to vote can be found
in the Court's precedent, though it has tackled some aspects of vot-
ing.2 8 With Baker v. Carr, the Supreme Court introduced the
concept of equal representation, a concept derived from the clear
mandate of equal protection. 9 The Court's finding in that case
that a challenge to the allocation of state legislative seats to the
various districts of Tennessee was justiciable led almost inexorably
to Reynolds v. Sims, in which the Court pronounced the now famil-
iar "one man, one vote" principle. 30 But, its vote equality
jurisprudence is largely mechanical and inflexible. Thus, in Karcher
v. Daggett, the Court invalidated a districting plan with a disparity of
less than one percent between the most and least populous dis-
tricts.13 ' The Court's failure to articulate the foundation of the "one
man, one vote" principle led to an opinion that "describes the in-
jury in circular terms, substitutes general paeans to individualism
for concrete doctrinal analysis, and defines equality in a rigid me-
chanical way.",3 2  The Court's inflexibility derives from its
unwillingness to dive into the heart of the problem and articulate a
theory of voting. The absence of such a theory has "reduced [the
125. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 43 (Harvard University Press 1980)
(quoting ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT
THE BAR OF POLITICS 55 (2d ed. 1962)).
126. See Veith, 541 U.S. 267.
127. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 132 (1986) ("[U]nconstitutional discrimina-
tion occurs only when the electoral system is arranged in a manner that will consistently
degrade a voter's or a group of voters' influence on the political process as a whole."). See
generally Issacharoff, supra note 24, at 602-04 (discussing the problematic nature of the harm
as conceived by the Court).
128. See Heather K. Gerken, The Costs and Causes of Minimalism in Voting Cases: Baker v.
Carr and its Progeny, 80 N.C. L. REv. 1411, 1415 (2002) (discussing the Court's failure to
articulate a broad theory of voting rights).
129. SeeBakerv. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1961).
130. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
131. SeeKarcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 728 (1983).
132. Gerken, supra note 128, at 1415.
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Court] to asserting that population deviations cause an injury be-
cause they depart from the principle of one person, one vote," or,
in Justice Harlan's words, repeating the "tautology that 'equal'
means 'equal."" ' When confronted with the novel idea of measur-
ing equality by the probability that an individual vote would affect a
subsequent policy decision, the Court "merely asserted that the
personal right to vote is a value in itself,"14 thereby effectively sepa-
rating voting from any theory of democratic decision making. The
right to vote in a competitive election is not waiting to be discov-
ered in the Court's jurisprudence.
Thus, the Harvard Note's suggestion that the Court should base
a right to electoral competition on U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton13
and Cook v. Gralike1 6 is unpersuasive.' In Thornton, the Court
struck down an Arkansas constitutional amendment that imposed
term limits on congressional representatives. 38 Noting that choice
of representatives is one of the "most sacred parts" of the Constitu-
tion,13 9 the Court concluded that states cannot impose regulations
that "dictate electoral outcomes.., favor or disfavor a class of can-
didates, or ... evade important constitutional restraints."'4 In
Gralike, the Court held that the state's power to regulate the "time,
place, and manner" of congressional elections does not include
mandating disclosure of candidates' position on term limits on the
ballot.' 41 The impetus for the litigation was Article VIII of the Mis-
souri Constitution, which mandated that the legend "Disregarded
Voters' Instruction On Term Limits" appear on the ballot next to
the names of candidates opposed to the term limits for congres-
sional representatives presented therein.'43
Neither case is rooted in a detailed analysis of what it means to
vote, and neither can be easily applied to partisan gerrymandering.
Gerrymandering is complicated and "empirical evidence cannot
support so strong a claim as assigning to the gerrymander exclusive
133. Id. at 1430 (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 590 (1964) (Harlan,J., dissent-
ing)).
134. Id.
135. 514 U.S. 779, 782-85 (1995) (holding that states cannot vary the constitutional
qualifications for representatives by imposing term limits).
136. 531 U.S. 510, 515 (2001) (holding that states do not have the power to require that
candidates' positions on term limits be noted on the ballot).
137. SeeA New Map, supra note 6, at 1208-13.
138. See Thornton, 514 U.S. at 782-85 (1995).
139. Id. at 795 (quoting Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 534 (1969)).
140. Id. at 833-34. See also A New Map, supra note 6, at 1209-11 (discussing both Thorn-
ton, 514 U.S. at 779, and Gralike, 531 U.S. at 510).
141. Gralike, 531 U.S. at 515.
142. Id. at 514-15.
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or even primary responsibility for the electoral prowess of incum-
bents."43 Moreover, gerrymandering is not the last word on a
candidate, unlike term limits. In Gralike, the Court repudiated "a
regime in which a state officer-the secretary of state-is permitted
to judge and punish Members of Congress for their legislative ac-
tions or positions."1" But, in Gralike the state attempted to interfere
with the voters' deliberations in the voting booth because of a spe-
cific policy position. That situation is quite distant from the
political jockeying of partisan gerrymandering: gerrymandering
punishes the opposite party for being the opposite party, not indi-
vidual legislators for their stances on individual issues. Therefore,
even without consideration of contrary precedent, the extension of
Thornton and Gralike to ban partisan gerrymandering is not viable.
If the problem of partisan gerrymandering cannot be solved by
the Court's current doctrines, it should not attempt to resolve the
problem at all.4 Any judicial solution would create its own federal-
ism problems by diminishing incentives for state level legislative
action. Courts harm democracy when they act too quickly to ad-
dress grievances that can otherwise be solved through legislation.
Moreover, that harm becomes a federalism harm because a single
notion of legitimacy-the Court's-supplants all others. There is
no legitimacy to that usurpation of power because partisan gerry-
mandering cases call upon courts to "make decisions based on
highly political judgments-judgments that courts are inherently
ill-equipped to make.' 46 Experience also shows the folly of judicial
intervention. The one instance where a federal court overturned
an election system because of its partisan effects starkly reveals the
judiciary's incompetence in the political field. Immediately after
the Fourth Circuit held that the ability of North Carolina Republi-
cans to contest judicial elections had been unconstitutionally
143. Issacharoff, supra note 24, at 626.
144. Gralike, 531 U.S. at 517 (quoting Gralike v. Cook, 191 F-3d 911, 922 (8th Cir.
1999)).
145. In an alternative universe in which Baker, 369 U.S. at 186, and Reynolds, 377 U.S. at
533, espoused a comprehensive conception of the right to vote, the principles therein could
be employed to end partisan gerrymandering. But they did not.
146. Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 894 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring); see also
Issacharoff, supra note 122, at 1686:
Without a discrete group on whose behalf the courts must assess the outcome fairness
of the political process, judicial review threatens to become an unprincipled exercise
in which judges fashion the election structures to suit their fancy or, worse, the fancy
of the political powers that delivered them to judicial office.
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In confronting gerrymandering, Congress has two alternatives:
legislate standards for the states to use in districting or draw the
lines itself. Direct participation by Congress is hardly an alternative,
since the result will simply be gerrymandering by Congress rather
than gerrymandering by the states. Congress could, however, estab-
lish an independent agency for congressional districting.
With the ability to take a prophylactic approach and ignore such
issues as harm to particularized individuals or identifiable groups,
Congress could create an agency tasked with drawing politically
competitive districts based on data from past elections. Political
isolation would ensure that it operated independently of the politi-
cians its work impacted. That alone might be sufficient. An
independent federal commission that drew district boundaries on
any basis would eliminate the historical federalism problem and
one of the key elements of the functional problem-linking fed-
eral and state choices. The key point is that the state legislature no
longer be involved so that voters can chose state legislators uncon-
strained by any impact that choice will have on their federal
representation.
Enforcing any detailed congressional scheme, however, raises
federalism problems because of the diversity of interests and situa-
tions. For instance, districts shaped on the basis of competition
inevitably would sometimes be quite bizarre. One might imagine
that San Francisco would have to be divided into multiple districts
that would meander throughout California picking up Republicans
to balance the Democrats packed into the city proper. If the single-
member districts do not actually correspond to anything cogniza-
ble to the population, then there would appear little reason to use
them in a system where competition is paramount.4 That a
147. See Issacharoff, supra note 24, at 604 (discussing Republican Party of N. C. v. Martin,
980 E2d 943 (4th Cir. 1992)).
148. There are many potential systems of voting that would enshrine competition as the
paramount value. One such system would entail a multimember district. Several candidates
competing for fewer spots might well produce a lively debate that enhances citizen partici-
pation in government in some fashion. Another plan might be to list voting on a statewide
basis. Cumulative voting would also work, and it would provide the added benefit of allow-
ing voters to express the intensity of their preference. Districted elections do, however, have
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bizarrely-shaped district might pose a problem raises the prospect
that competition should not be the sole goal of a districting system.
Additional goals might include creating a community of interest in
order to encourage citizen participation (one of the virtues of fed-
eralism) ;149 they might also include creating blocks of racial
minority influence under Georgia v. Ashcrof.'50 Suddenly, the situa-
tion is quite complex.
To contain the problem of bizarre shapes and to address other
goals, the agency might use traditional districting criteria-
municipal and county lines, natural features, visual compactness,
and contiguity. In other words, it would ideally use the things that
demarcate community in everyday life to describe the boundaries
of maximally competitive political communities. That would re-
quire the federal government to delve deeply into the political
identities of 435 districts.
Consequently, the federal effort to create competitive districts
would run head-long into three of the principle justifications for
federalism: resentment of intervention by remote powers, respon-
siveness to diverse preferences, and experimentation. 5'
Federalization of congressional districting could engender resent-
ment because it diffuses the power citizens have over how their
political "community" is constituted. In fact, the political separa-
tion of redistricting through an independent agency would
eliminate local power completely, and only by eliminating the
agency or its independence could they reclaim that control. Under
state regimes, voter control of congressional redistricting is greater
the virtue of helping create "two broad-based, relatively centrist parties," which consist of
groups that have coalesced before the election. Samuel Issacharoff, Why Elections, 116
HARV. L. REv. 684, 694 (2002).
149. McConnell, supra note 107, at 1510 (discussing "public spiritedness").
150. 539 U.S. 461 (2003) (upholding disaggregation of minority voting power in a dis-
tricting plan that created numerous districts of minority influence and reduced the number
of districts of minority dominance).
151. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991). According to the Court:
This federalist structure of joint sovereigns preserves to the people numerous advan-
tages. It assures a decentralized government that will be more sensitive to the diverse
needs of a heterogenous [sic] society; it increases opportunity for citizen involvement
in democratic processes; it allows for more innovation and experimentation in gov-
ernment; and it makes government more responsive by putting the States in
competition for a mobile citizenry.
Id; See generally McConnell, supra note 107, at 1491-511 (discussing the advantages of feder-
alism, including the fulfillment of diverse preferences, experimentation, and increased
involvement in the democratic process).
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because it is not mediated through Congress. 5 2 The change would
be especially drastic in states with occasional plebiscites on such
matters, such as California.
A related concern is that, even within the band of legitimacy de-
fined by Congress, different geographical communities will have
varying goals for "their" districting. The federal government would
find it difficult, if not impossible, to accurately process diverse
preferences. 53 A meaningful congressional policy would have to
provide uniform goals for the whole nation, inevitably leaving
some communities with sub-optimal districting. In contrast, state
level control would be more efficient because it provides fifty dif-
ferent sets of districting priorities to fulfill the preferences of "The
People."
A further result of uniform standards is the suppression of ex-
perimentation. To the extent that federalism devolves
154responsibility it encourages innovation. Because the most satis
factory methods cannot be known ex ante, experimentation would
be essential to a successful reform movement. Though decentrali-
zation provides the benefits of experimentation,155 it cannot easily
accommodate divergent normative goals.5 6 A viable national redis-
tricting scheme should incorporate a level of flexibility that would
be implausible in a merely decentralized system.
Based on those concerns, the preferable federal role is to man-
date separation of state legislatures from the process of redistricting.
Congress could also require the use of some districting criteria that
152. Though this control has federalism consequences only so long as it is mediated by
the legislature, if it were mediated by an elected or appointed districting commission, one
with responsibility only for districting, there would at least be no linking of state and federal
policy choices.
153. McConnell, supra note 107, at 1493-94.
154. See generally id. at 1499-500.
155. Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41
UCLA L. REv. 903, 923-25 (1994) (describing how decentralization can promote experi-
mentation).
156. See id. at 923. According to Rubin and Feeley:
[T] he Supreme Court and the commentators can argue in favor of federalism when
they mean decentralization because the general absence of normative variation in the
United States has made the two concepts functionally equivalent. If our federal sys-
tem in fact provides opportunities for voice, options for exit; or economic efficiency,
the reason is that every sub-unit of our federal system shares that goal. But this lack of
variation makes federalism vestigial; it is simply decentralization in fancy clothes, and
the rights that it grants to each state protect little more than their own continued ex-
istence.
Id. Decentralization works when the central authority can use experimentation to find the
best method of achieving its goal. It can then implement that method broadly.
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will make gerrymandering more difficult, such as compactness, 157
or the absence of which will make gerrymandering obvious, like
respect for municipal boundaries.18 That will resolve much of the
federalism problem with representation while capturing the bene-
fits of federalism in the actual process of drawing the lines.
Unfortunately, it will not resolve the political problem. As noted
in Part III, political parties link all levels of government. The prob-
lem of political capture is general: the two parties have captured
American government and divided the spoils between them. Fed-
eral politicians collude with state legislatures in their redistricting
chicanery. The most recent and flagrant example of such collusion
came from Texas in 2003, when United States House Majority
Leader Tom DeLay engineered the passage of a new redistricting
plan by the Texas Legislature.'5 9 However desirable redistricting
reform may be from the federalist perspective, politicians have no
incentive to enact it.
VI. STATE SOLUTIONS AS GUIDEPOSTS
Popular campaigns for change, however, might provide impetus
for a legislative solution to the partisan gerrymandering problem.
Numerous state campaigns for reform are building momentum,
and several states have already enacted some type of independent
districting process 6° There is some momentum for change, and
states with plebiscites, like California, can circumvent captured
state governments. In 2001, Arizona voters passed a constitutional
amendment changing the process of districting for state and fed-
eral elections. 16 1 Twelve states-including Arizona-have enacted
some alternative to a bare-knuckled political brawl over redistrict-
ing their state legislative districts; six states have done the same for
their congressional districts.162 As happened with the Seventeenth
157. See Bernard Grofman, Criteria for Districting: A Social Science Perspective, 33 UCLA L.
REV. 77, 90-91 (1985) (discussing the effect of a compactness criterion on districting).
158. See id at 118 (listing various indicia of gerrymandering, including "[u]nnecessarily
disregjfuding city, town, and county boundaries in drawing district lines").
159. See Charles Babington, Hey, They're Taking Slash and Burn to Extremes!, WASH. POST,
Dec. 21, 2003, at B01.
160. See Adam Nagourney, States See Growing Campaign for New Redistricting Laws, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 3, 2005, at Al.
161. See David K. Pauole, Comment, Race, Politics & (In)Equality: Proposition 106 Alters the
Face and Rules of Redistrictingin Arizona, 33 ARIz. ST. L.J. 1219 (2001).
162. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, REDISTRICTING COMMISSIONS
AND ALTERNATIVES TO THE LEGISLATURE CONDUCTING REDISTRICTING (2004), available at
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Amendment, cumulative state changes could politically force the
federal government to act.6 3 Any federal solution, however, would
almost surely have to permit the state solutions already enacted,
which can provide valuable guidance in the drafting of a statute
mandating some sort of independent commission.
A. Existing State Plans
Several states already use commissions of various kinds for con-
gressional districting. 64 Iowa's plan has been particularly successful.
The plan directs a legislative staff agency to create a politically neu-
tral plan: "[s]pecifically, the Iowa Code provides that districts shall
not be drawn to favor any political party, an incumbent legislator
or member of Congress, or any other person or group, or for the
purpose of augmenting or diluting the voting strength of a lan-
guage or racial minority group." 65 Beyond that, the law requires
populations in each district "as nearly equal as practicable to the
ideal district population" and that "[t]he number of counties and
cities divided among more than one district ... be as small as pos-
sible." 66 It also stipulates that "[i]t is preferable that districts be
compact in form," though it subordinates that interest to the oth-
ers. 167 This plan is approved or rejected by the legislature and only
corrective amendments are allowed. 68 Competition is mentioned
nowhere in the law, and consideration of political factors is ex-
pressly prohibited. 169 Nevertheless, Iowa accounted for ten percent
of the nation's competitive congressional elections in 2002, though
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/legman/redistrict/com&alter.htm (on file with the Univer-
sity of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) [hereinafter Redistricting].
163. See generally Ralph A. Rossum, The Irony of Constitutional Democracy: Federalism, the Su-
preme Court, and the Seventeenth Amendment, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 671, 708-11 (1999)
(describing a buildup of popular sentiment).
164. These states are: Arizona, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana (fallback commission), Montana,
New Jersey, and Washington. For brief descriptions of their systems, see Redistricting, supra
note 162. This Note considers only the plans used by states with the most numerous con-
gressional delegations.
165. IowA GENERAL ASSEMBLY-LEGISLATIVE SERVICES BuREAu, LEGISLATIVE GUIDE TO
REDISTRICTING (Dec. 2000) (citing IowA CODE § 42.4(5)), available at http://
www.legis.state.ia.us/Central/LSB/Guides/redist.htm (on file with the University of Michi-
gan journal of Law Reform).
166. IOWA CODE § 42.4(1)-(2) (2003).
167. Id. § 42.4(4).
168. If the first plan is rejected, then the legislative staff prepares another. If this too is
rejected, then the third plan prepared by the staff may be amended. Id. § 42.3(1)-(3).
169. Id. § 42.4(5).
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it elects barely one percent of Congress.'7 The results show this
formulation to be worthy of emulation.
Arizona's recent reform offers other alternatives. Arizona's dis-
tricting is the product of a five-person commission, of which no
more than two members may belong to the same political party.
7
1
No member may have been a candidate for office in the prior
three years or be a paid lobbyist.72 The law requires: compactness;
respect for "communities of interest"; use of geographical features,
cities, and counties as borders (when practical); and competitive-
ness, "where to do so would create no significant detriment to the
other goals." 73 In other words, competition is the least favored
goal. Further, the Arizona scheme also precludes the use of politi-
cal data-party registration, voting history, etc.-in the initial
drafting of the plan. 74 Perhaps because competition is not the
principal focus of the plan and political data is excluded from con-
sideration, the 2004 results from Arizona 7 5 show a significant
number of landslide victories in House races.
Washington uses a plan similar to Arizona's in most material re-
spects. 76 However, it uses a different formulation of the
competition goal: "[t]he commission shall exercise its powers to
provide fair and effective representation and to encourage elec-
toral competition," and there is no prohibition on using political
data. 7  Importantly, unlike Arizona, Washington does not make
competition a subordinate consideration, and of Washington's
nine congressional districts, at least one had a close election in
2004, with fifty-two percent to forty-seven percent split.78
New Jersey uses a vastly different plan. It features a bipartisan
commission consisting of twelve appointees and one nonpartisan
170. See Issacharoff, supra note 147, at 693. This may be an artifact of Iowa's relatively
small size. There are only so many ways to reasonably draw districts in a small state.
171. ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1(3). See also Rhonda L. Barnes, Comment, Redistrict-
ing in Arizona Under the Proposition 106 Provisions: Retrogression, Representation and Regret, 35
ARIZ. ST. LJ. 575, 578 (2003) (reviewing qualifications for service).
172. Aaiz. CoNsT. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1 (3).
173. SeeARiz. CoNsT. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1(14).
174. Id. § 1(3).
175. Elections 2004-Arizona, WASHINGTONPOST.cOM, Nov. 24, 2004, at http://www.
washirgtonpost.com/wp-srv/elections/2004/az/ (on file with the University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform).
176. For instance, four members of the five member commission are appointed by party
leaders in each house. The four then choose a chairperson. WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 44.05.030 (West 1998).
177. Id. § 44.05.090.
178. U.S. President-Washington, WASHINGTONPOST.COM (2004), available at http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/elections/2004/wa/ (on file with the University of Michi-
gan Journal of Law Reform).
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commissioner chosen by the political appointees. 79 In the past, the
commission's "tie-breaking members have taken an overtly politi-
cal-but consciously balanced-approach to the inherently
political task of redistricting," that has successfully avoided partisan
gerrymandering, but succumbed to the allure of the bipartisan
gerrymander.'80
Another possible variation was recently proposed by California
Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, whose plan would entrust redis-
tricting to retired judges. 8' Such a plan would likely eliminate the
influence of party operatives and the possibility of a bipartisan ger-
rymander. Depending on how the judges are appointed, however,
the plan could also eliminate the accountability of the panel, which
presents another problem.
Considering these plans, three salient points arise: (1) how con-
gressional districts account for existing communities is important,
(2) states have already elected several different methods of creat-
ing a map, and (3) states differ as to whether or not political data
may be considered in drawing the map. The diversity between
them reinforces the need for a federalist approach. But, it also
highlights the need for federal normative standards: the diversity
may in fact be too large, especially in view of NewJersey's tendency
to enact bipartisan gerrymanders. 
1 2
B. A Federal Statute
Any federal statute designed to reduce gerrymandering should
encourage further innovation by the states both to find the most
expedient means of limiting political influence and to find the
right balance between competitiveness and partisan fairness. But, it
should also make bipartisan gerrymandering difficult in those
states-like Arizona-that use a largely bipartisan commission. A
statute fulfilling such ends might read:
Each state shall empower a board, commission, or other entity
to create a redistricting plan delineating the districts required
179. N.J. CONST. art. II, § 2(1)(b)-(c).
180. Hirsch, supra note 3, at 215.
181. John Fund, Editorial, Arnold v. Gerry: Schwarzenegger takes on the incumbent-protection
racket, WSJ.coM, Feb. 7, 2005, at http:// http://www.opinionjournal.com/diary/?id=
110006260 (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
182. Hirsch, supra note 3, at 214-15.
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by 2 U.S.C.A. § 2c. The members of such entity shall be cho-
sen in a manner defined by state law, except that no elected
or party official shall serve on the entity. Such entity: shall
consider compactness; shall not divide counties and munici-
palities, where reasonably possible; shall utilize municipal
lines, county lines, and natural barriers wherever reasonably
possible to demarcate some or all of the boundaries of con-
gressional districts; and shall consider such other factors as
each state may designate. Each redistricting plan shall comply
with the provisions of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973.
Specifying how the commissions would be structured would be
both unduly restrictive and unnecessary: it would be politically im-
possible to structure a commission to increase partisan domination
of the process. Further, the proposed statute would make gerry-
mandering more difficult by making it hard to draw the bizarre
shapes successful gerrymandering entails but otherwise preserves
the states' flexibility. The proposed statute also avoids the problem
of litigating the definition of compactness by not making it manda-
tory. Instead, it invites litigation over the definition of "reasonably
possible" and the potential division of county lines. No statutory
mandate will ever avoid litigation unless it abandons its purpose
and imposes no restrictions on the states; all that can reasonably be
hoped for is to limit litigation to a few finite issues. A great many
formulations might do so while providing guidance and flexibility
to states, and the above example is merely one.
VII. CONCLUSION
Partisan gerrymandering presents a serious harm to the federal
system, both as originally conceived and as a matter of its present
finctioning. The partisan gerrymander places "too great an agency
of the State Governments in the General one," in the words of
James Madison. 183 Direct rule over the people and a direct depend-
ency on the people are the foundation of the federalist system.
Gerrymanders that undermine that foundation risk upsetting the
edifice of federal government, turning directly elected senators
into the people's counterweight to the parties. In functional terms,
gerrymanders combine with the party system to make it difficult for
183. MADISON, supra note 46, at 75.
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the people to elect differing policy choices on the state and federal
levels. They diminish responsiveness and accountability. In short,
the gerrymander degrades democracy.
The remedy for that problem is federal intervention, however
implausible it seems. Such intervention is partly justified by its
process: Congress can forge a national consensus about how to
constitute itself. Such a consensus would vindicate the national in-
terest in the legitimacy of the House of Representatives as a body.
Furthermore, the federal government has a legitimate interest in
galvanizing the nation with unifying principles. One such principle
may be the value of electoral competition. But, there are other
principles too.
Any federal remedy, however, should itself accord with the prin-
ciples of federalism--experimentation, fulfillment of local
preferences, and the desire for local control. To that end, it should
afford the states flexibility in crafting measures that fulfill their citi-
zens' preferences. Each state could then balance its desires for
stability, partisan fairness, and competition. The paramount objec-
tive of any federal reform should be to ensure that voters can make
separate decisions for state and federal elections and that such a
decision follows a balanced districting process.
The absence of such a process has greatly diminished the com-
petitiveness of House elections. In the 2002 election, roughly half
of all U.S. Senate and gubernatorial elections were decided by ten
points or less, while less than ten percent of House races were de-
cided by such a margin.'84 Worse still, some of those "competitive"
elections were themselves the products of redistricting. 5 State leg-
islators are severely limiting the ability of citizens to choose their
federal representatives. This limitation accords with neither the
principles of democracy nor the principles of federalism. Reform is
in order.
184. Hirsch, supra note 3, at 183.
185. See id. at 188-89 (discussing particular races).

